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Abstract
Preserving the privacy of individuals by protecting their sensitive attributes is an important consid-
eration during microdata release. However, it is equally important to preserve the quality or utility of
the data for at least some targeted workloads. We propose a novel framework for privacy preservation
based on the k-anonymity model that is ideally suited for workloads that require preserving the proba-
bility distribution of the quasi-identifier variables in the data. Our framework combines the principles of
distribution-preserving quantization and k-member clustering, and we specialize it to two variants that
respectively use intra-cluster and Gaussian dithering of cluster centers to achieve distribution preser-
vation. We perform theoretical analysis of the proposed schemes in terms of distribution preservation,
and describe their utility in workloads such as covariate shift and transfer learning where such a prop-
erty is necessary. Using extensive experiments on real-world Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data,
we demonstrate the merits of our algorithms over standard k-anonymization for a hallmark health care
application where an insurance company wishes to understand the risk in entering a new market. Fur-
thermore, by empirically quantifying the reidentification risk, we also show that the proposed approaches
indeed maintain k-anonymity.
Keywords— privacy, microdata release, distribution preservation, k-member clustering, reidentifcation
risk, supervised learning, health care, transfer learning, covariate shift, dithering, Rosenblatt’s transforma-
tion
1 Introduction
Data owners often employ data analysts to provide them with accurate and actionable insights. In many
important domains, the data to be analyzed consists of individual records with sensitive fields that must be
protected to maintain privacy. The passing of data from owner to analyst, known as microdata release or
publishing, necessitates anonymization or some other similar privacy protection operation in these applica-
tions. A commonly used privacy criterion in microdata publishing is k-anonymity [1, 2]. Any operation on a
data set whose result achieves k-anonymity is equally good from the privacy perspective; it is the workload
for which the data is to be used that defines the quality or utility of the operation [2, 3, 4].
A key tool for the data analyst in developing insights is supervised learning. In certain challenging
settings, labeled training data is available to the supervised learning algorithm for one problem or set of
conditions, but testing is to be performed on a different problem or set of conditions. One common way of
addressing this challenge is by transfer learning and covariate shift methods that reweight training samples
in accordance with the probability distributions of the different problems [5, 6, 7]. In this paper, our
contribution is to develop the first (to the best of our knowledge) k-anonymity approach for workloads such
as transfer learning and covariate shift that require the preservation of the probability distributions of the
data [8].
Consider a number of colleges with different student distributions that want to release their data to enable
the accurate learning of predictive models for a common learning outcome [9]. Using the data from all of
∗Portions of this work were first presented at the 2015 SIAM International Conference on Data Mining.
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the colleges together allows for better learning than separately due to the advantages of transfer learning,
but releasing such information is fraught with privacy issues such as satisfying the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) in the United States [10]. There are similar laws in applications besides
education, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in health care and
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in personal finance. Several statistical interpretations of the legal
language for protecting privacy exist; the property of k-anonymity is a common interpretation to lower the
risk of reidentification [11, 12].
As another example, consider the change in the landscape of health insurance in the United States after
the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Health insurance companies entered new
markets, defined by geography, by age group, and by other prospect base criteria. When the legislation
was being enacted, the companies had to decide which new markets to enter using the information at their
disposal at the time. In making the decisions, companies sought to enter markets containing an abundance
of profitable, i.e. low-cost, individuals likely to enroll in their plans. This objective gives rise to the problem
of market risk assessment, the estimation of cost profiles of new market populations. Successful market
risk assessment, however, faces at least two challenges. On the privacy front, even internal use of individual
health data by an insurance company for its planning and strategy is protected by HIPAA. On the supervised
learning front, the companies had access to member health cost data from their existing markets available for
training, but no such cost data available for the new markets, necessitating predictive models with covariate
shift.
In privacy, there are three types of variables: key attributes, quasi-identifiers, and sensitive attributes.
Key attributes, such as the name of the person, are always dropped before microdata release. Quasi-identifiers
are often demographic variables like age, gender, and postal code that can be matched to other publicly-
available data sets such as voter registration records containing both key attributes and quasi-identifiers to
reveal identities in the data set to be protected. It is this type of identity disclosure that k-anonymity aims
to protect against. Under the k-anonymity privacy model, the quasi-identifiers for an individual cannot be
distinguished from the quasi-identifiers of at least k− 1 other individuals [1, 2]. The sensitive attributes are
variables such as educational or medical test results.
There are many anonymization algorithms to transform the quasi-identifier attributes of a data set to
achieve k-anonymity, but these existing algorithms do not seek to preserve the data distribution, as is required
for covariate shift and transfer learning. Existing algorithms for k-anonymity include generalizations and
suppressions [3], multidimensional generalization [13], and multidimensional clustering in which the samples
or records in the data are grouped by similarity such that the smallest group has at least k elements [14].
Clustering approaches offer the most flexibility and best performance.
The reason that existing clustering approaches to anonymization are not distribution-preserving is as
follows: the optimization criterion is based on the average distortion of the individual samples and with
such a criterion, the optimal cluster centers do not follow the same distribution as the original data. In the
asymptotic limit as the number of clusters goes to infinity, the distribution of the cluster center locations is
the original data distribution to the one third power, properly normalized [15].
Distribution-preserving quantization is an alternative to standard clustering methods that does have the
desired output behavior [16, 17]. It has been developed in the context of audio signal processing and has
never been considered in the privacy preservation context before. Specifically, the approach of [16] is based
on subtractive dithered quantization [18] followed by Rosenblatt’s transformation [19]. We emphasize that
although dithering, the introduction of noise or random perturbations, is fraught with several issues when
used for privacy preservation [20], in our work, the introduction of noise is not for anonymization purposes,
but to allow the manipulation of the distribution. Since distribution-preserving quantization comes from
the signal processing and communications domain, not the privacy domain, it does not aim to achieve k-
anonymity. In particular, like k-means clustering and other standard clustering methods, it takes the number
of clusters as an input parameter rather than the minimum number of samples in each cluster, which is what
is needed for k-anonymity.
Clustering for k-anonymity requires a different problem setup, given the name k-member clustering in
[14]. The k-member clustering problem has the k of k-anonymity as the input parameter rather than
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the number of clusters. Algorithms for k-member clustering may be divided into two classes: objective-
driven optimization algorithms and simple scalable algorithms. The first class includes algorithms based
on minimum-cost network flow [21] and a cluster penalty function [22]. The second class includes greedy
clustering [14], subsampling and local optimization [23], and constrained agglomerative clustering [24]. This
problem is also related to clustering with maximum cluster size constraints [25, 26], semi-supervised clustering
[27], and maximum output entropy quantization [28].
Contribution. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing approach that transforms quasi-identifier
data to achieve k-anonymity while also preserving its probability distribution. Our solution combines the
key aspects of k-member clustering algorithms with the key aspects of distribution-preserving quantization
to obtain a distribution-preserving k-anonymity transformation. We propose two ways to dither cluster cen-
ters: intra-cluster dither and Gaussian dither. For each, we theoretically analyze the distribution-preserving
properties. As the distribution preservation is motivated by workloads such as covariate shift and transfer
learning that require the data distribution, we detail how our proposed method can be used in conjunction
with those machine learning tasks. We demonstrate the proposed approach on real-world Medical Expen-
diture Panel Survey (MEPS) data for the health insurance market risk assessment application mentioned
above. We find that the proposed method does in fact maintain k-anonymity empirically by investigating
reidentification risk and find that the distribution preservation is critical to obtaining usable machine learning
predictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on the transfer
learning and covariate shift problems encountered in supervised learning. In Section 3, we develop the new
privacy-preservation method for the workloads of interest that combines aspects of k-member clustering and
distribution-preserving quantization. In Section 4, we provide empirical results on real-world health care
data for market risk assessment. Section 5 provides a summary and discussion.
2 Covariate Shift and Transfer Learning
In this section, we first introduce notation, then describe the basic learning problem encountered in the
covariate shift setting, and finally describe the problem in the transfer learning setting. Random variables
are indicated by capital letters and their samples by lowercase letters. E is used to denote the expectation
of a random variable.
Consider the following general supervised learning problem: we wish to predict a response variable Y
using predictor variables X . Given a class of functions F and training samples (xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n, a
predictor function is selected from F to minimize the empirical risk,
Yˆ (·) = arg min
f∈F
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(f(xi), yi), (1)
for some choice of loss function L that measures the error between the predicted response f(xi) and actual
response yi.
Assume that the training samples are drawn i.i.d. from the joint distribution pX,Y = pXpY |X . The
problem of covariate shift occurs when the predictor variables or covariates are drawn from a different
distribution qX in the test phase. The conditional distribution pY |X is assumed to remain the same. In
the most idealized setting, covariate shift does not necessarily pose a problem: As the number of samples
n→∞, the empirical risk in (1) converges to the population risk
E [L(f(X), Y )] = E [E [L(f(X), Y ) | X ]] ,
from which it can be seen that the optimal choice of predictor f depends only on the conditional distribution
pY |X , regardless of the marginal distribution for X (e.g. pX or qX). Hence as n → ∞, the conditional
distribution pY |X can be learned very accurately and the optimal predictor can be obtained provided that
the class F is rich enough to contain it. However, in practical settings where n is finite or F is overly
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constrained, then the predictor Yˆ resulting from (1) generally depends on the training distribution pX and
thus can be mismatched to the test distribution qX under which performance is evaluated.
A straightforward solution to covariate shift is to weight the training samples by the ratio
w(x) =
qX(x)
pX(x)
.
This weighting represents the relative importance of each sample under qX rather than pX . The weighted
empirical risk
1
n
n∑
i=1
w(xi)L(f(xi), yi)
then converges to
EpXpY |X [w(X)L(f(X), Y )] = EqXpY |X [L(f(X), Y )] , (2)
thus matching the test distribution.
In the transfer learning problem, we have m different tasks each with their own joint distributions in
training and testing: pX,Y |T and qX,Y |T , where T ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is a variable indicating the task. The tasks
may be related to each other and we would like to use the training samples from all other tasks in helping
learn ft, the predictor for task t. Like covariate shift, the transfer learning problem may be addressed by
distribution matching through the weight
w(x, y | T = t) = pX,Y |T (x, y | T = t)∑m
t′=1 pT (T = t
′)pX,Y |T (x, y | T = t′)
qX|T (x | T = t)
pX|T (x | T = t) .
Note that the second part of the weight is the same as the covariate shift weight to take differences between
training and testing into account. The first part of the weight allows for the transfer of information across
tasks. With this weight, we have convergence to [6]:
E
∑
m
t′=1
pt′pX|t′pY |X,t′
[w(X,Y | t)L(ft(X), Y )] = EqX|tpY |X,t [L(ft(X), Y )] , (3)
thereby matching the test distribution of task t.
We must also estimate the weights w(x) and w(x, y | t) that we have defined in the learning process.
There are a variety of ways to estimate them including nonparametric methods and methods based on logistic
regression, cf. [8, 6]. We do not go into the details here, but only emphasize that the data distributions are
the key ingredient when estimating the weights. Therefore, any privacy preservation operation performed
on the data should ideally preserve the data distributions.
3 Distribution-Preserving k-Anonymity
As discussed in the introduction, the privacy of individuals must be protected when working with their
personal data in domains such as education and health care. In particular, taking k-anonymity as the notion
of privacy, the quasi-identifiers x in the original data must be converted to some other values xˆ in a way that
the data for an individual cannot be distinguished from at least k−1 others. (For notational simplicity, we use
x, y generically in this section to refer to training data distributed as pX,Y in the standard supervised learning
or covariate shift settings, or to each training data set distributed as pX,Y |T=t, t = 1, . . . ,m in the transfer
learning setting.) Moreover, given our ultimate goal of predicting response Y , we not only want the samples
xˆi, i = 1, . . . , n to have the k-anonymity property, but also the model learned from (xˆi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n to
have small prediction error, as quantified by relative bias, R2, or other measures of generalization.
With these dual goals in mind, in [8] we introduced a sequence of operations inspired by k-member
clustering [14] and distribution-preserving quantization with dithering and transformation [16]. In the
present paper, we generalize and further develop this framework. Figure 1 illustrates the overall proce-
dure. Section 3.1 discusses the first step of k-member clustering while Section 3.2 discusses the subsequent
distribution-recovering transformation.
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Figure 1: Block diagram of the operations to achieve k-anonymity and distribution preservation.
3.1 k-Member Clustering
The original data (xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n is first clustered subject to the k-anonymity requirement that each
cluster contain at least k members. Define c to be the number of clusters and let ℓ = 1, . . . , c index the
clusters. Let aiℓ = 1 if sample i is assigned to cluster ℓ and aiℓ = 0 otherwise. Denote by (x¯ℓ, y¯ℓ) the
centroid chosen to represent the samples in cluster ℓ. The centroids are determined in part by a function
d ((xi, yi), (x¯ℓ, y¯ℓ)) that measures the distortion between two points. Here we choose d to be a weighted
squared Euclidean distance,
d
(
(xi, yi),
(
x¯ℓ, y¯ℓ
))
=
∥∥xi − x¯ℓ∥∥22 + w(yi − y¯ℓ)2, (4)
where w > 0 is the weight on the response component relative to the quasi-identifier components, intended
to account for any scale difference between them.
With the foregoing definitions, k-member clustering can be formulated as the following optimization
problem:
min
{aiℓ},{(x¯ℓ,y¯ℓ)}
n∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
aiℓd
(
(xi, yi),
(
x¯ℓ, y¯ℓ
))
s.t. aiℓ ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, ℓ,
c∑
ℓ=1
aiℓ = 1 ∀ i,
n∑
i=1
aiℓ ≥ k ∀ ℓ.
(5)
The last line in (5) expresses the k-member constraint while the second-last line ensures that each sample
is assigned to exactly one cluster. These constraints imply that the number of clusters c is at most ⌊n
k
⌋. In
this work, we simply fix c = ⌊n
k
⌋; optimization over the number of clusters is a subject for future study.
Solutions to the k-member clustering problem (5) can be obtained using methods such as [21, 22, 14, 23,
24] discussed in Section 1. In the experiments of Section 4, due to its scalability, we use the greedy algorithm
proposed in [14] modified to use the Euclidean distortion function (4).
Once a solution to (5) has been determined, the original response values yi are set aside, to be rejoined
only at the end with the transformed quasi-identifiers xˆi. In place of each original xi, we record only the
cluster ℓi to which it was assigned, i.e. ℓi = ℓ for which aiℓ = 1. For each cluster ℓ, the associated set of
values Vℓ = {xi, i : aiℓ = 1} is retained; the centroid x¯ℓ is a function of Vℓ and may or may not be retained
depending on the type of dither to be applied. Importantly however, an index i is no longer linked to any
single value in Vℓi . In this way the clustering step achieves our goal of k-anonymity; since all operations
that follow depend only on the whole sets Vℓi , a level of privacy equivalent to k-anonymity is maintained.
In Section 4.3, we confirm through reidentification experiments that the proposed distribution-recovering
operations not only preserve k-anonymity but can also result in even stronger privacy.
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3.2 Distribution-Recovering Transformation
The operations following k-member clustering in Figure 1 aim to reconstruct a k-anonymous data set that
follows the distribution of X . Using the clustering output described at the end of Section 3.1, the first
operation of dithering (the intentional application of noise) produces x˜i, i = 1, . . . , n, sampled from a
continuous probability distribution. (By contrast, simply using the centroids x¯ℓ would result in a discrete
distribution.) Different types of dither give rise to different variants of the proposed procedure. This makes
our framework quite general since any dither with a continuous distribution may be used. In Sections 3.2.1
and 3.2.2, we discuss two versions corresponding to intra-cluster and Gaussian dither.
The final two operations in Figure 1 constitute Rosenblatt’s transformation [19] for transforming an
arbitrary continuous distribution into a specified target distribution, in our case that of X . The first of these
operations, transformation to a uniform distribution, is given by the following sequence of (conditional)
cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of X˜, one for each dimension:
ui1 = FX˜1(x˜i1) = FX˜1|X˜0
(
x˜i1 | x˜0i
)
ui2 = FX˜2|X˜1
(
x˜i2 | x˜i1
)
= FX˜2|X˜1
(
x˜i2 | x˜1i
)
...
uid = FX˜d|X˜d−1
(
x˜id | x˜d−1i
)
,
(6)
where x˜j−1i is shorthand for x˜i1, . . . , x˜i,j−1 (similarly for other multi-dimensional quantities) and a superscript
of 0 is understood to indicate the empty list. The detailed forms of the CDFs in (6) depend on the choice of
dither and are specified in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Transformation (6) is applied to all samples i = 1, . . . , n
and can be done in parallel, for example cluster by cluster.
The last operation, transformation from a uniform distribution to the distribution of X , is similar to (6)
but with the inverse CDF of X :
xˆi1 = F
−1
X1
(ui1) = F
−1
X1|X0
(
ui1 | xˆ0i
)
xˆi2 = F
−1
X2|X1
(
ui2 | xˆi1
)
= F−1
X2|X1
(
ui2 | xˆ1i
)
...
xˆid = F
−1
Xd|Xd−1
(uid | xˆd−1i ),
(7)
where the generalized inverse CDF is defined as
F−1X (u) = inf{x : FX(x) ≥ u}. (8)
In practice, the underlying distribution that generates the data x is not known. Instead we use the empirical
distribution, in which case X can always be regarded as discrete. For each dimension j = 1, . . . , d, define
vj(1) < vj(2) < · · · < vj(nj), nj ≤ n, to be the distinct observed values of Xj in increasing order. Then by
specializing (8) to discrete distributions, transformation (7) can be expressed more explicitly as
xˆij = vj(ij) if
FXj |Xj−1
(
vj(ij − 1) | xˆj−1i
)
< uij ≤ FXj |Xj−1
(
vj(ij) | xˆj−1i
)
,
ij = 1, . . . , nj , j = 1, . . . , d, (9)
where we define vj(0) = −∞ for ij = 1 so that FXj |Xj−1(vj(0) | xˆj−1i ) = 0.
At the end of the process, the sensitive yi values are rejoined with the clustered and transformed quasi-
identifiers xˆi. Overall, this sequence of steps yields output samples (xˆi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n that are close to the
original samples (xi, yi) in distribution while being k-anonymous. The main free parameter, k, can be varied
to achieve the desired tradeoff between privacy and prediction error.
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3.2.1 Intra-cluster dither
In this subsection, we consider dither distributions that are supported only on the cluster to which a sample
belongs. In other words, for each i, the cluster assignment ℓi is viewed as a conditioning event and x˜i is
sampled randomly from the support of ℓi with probability one. Here the support can be any subset of R
d
that contains the points in Vℓi and no others.
The framework of Figure 1 with intra-cluster dither as defined above is still quite general since it leaves
open the exact specification of support sets and corresponding probability distributions. In the following we
show that it encompasses the important special case of random resampling with replacement from the values
within each cluster. In this approach, each transformed sample xˆi is drawn randomly from the value set Vℓi
of the corresponding cluster. A closely related alternative is resampling without replacement, in which xˆi
corresponding to the same cluster ℓi are chosen as a random permutation of Vℓi .
We focus here on resampling with replacement under the constraint that Xˆ preserves the distribution
of X , as in Figure 1. This constraint can be met by selecting values within a cluster according to their
empirical frequencies, as stated below in Lemma 1. First define v(i1, . . . , id) =
(
v1(i1), . . . , vd(id)
)
to be the
multi-dimensional extension of vj(ij), noting that some of these combinations of values may not be observed.
Denote by nℓ(i1, . . . , id) the number of samples in cluster ℓ with value v(i1, . . . , id); n(i1, . . . , id) (without
the subscript ℓ) denotes the corresponding number in all clusters; nℓ (without the indices ij) denotes the
number of samples in cluster ℓ (nℓ ≥ k from (5)); and n is the total number of samples as before. Some of
these definitions are illustrated in Figure 2 below.
Lemma 1. If for all samples i and conditioned on cluster ℓi, xˆi = v(i1, . . . , id) is chosen with probability
nℓi(i1, . . . , id)/nℓi , then the transformed quasi-identifiers Xˆ have the same distribution as X.
Proof. The lemma follows from calculating the probability mass function (PMF, denoted generically by p)
of Xˆ. Treating cluster membership as a conditioning random variable L, we have
p
Xˆ
(v(i1, . . . , id)) =
c∑
ℓ=1
pL(ℓ)pXˆ|L
(
v(i1, . . . , id) | ℓ
)
=
c∑
ℓ=1
nℓ
n
nℓ(i1, . . . , id)
nℓ
=
n(i1, . . . , id)
n
= pX(v(i1, . . . , id)),
using the definition of empirical distribution in the last line.
To establish the equivalence between the proposed procedure and resampling with replacement, we con-
struct a rectangular partition of Rd and define support sets accordingly. Figure 2 provides an illustration
in the two-dimensional case d = 2. For j = 1, . . . , d, let {Ij(ij)}njij=1 be a set of intervals that partition the
real line such that each Ij(ij) contains the observed value vj(ij). These intervals could be defined for exam-
ple by the midpoints between the vj(ij). The full d-dimensional space is partitioned into rectangular cells
C(i1, . . . , id) = I1(i1)×I2(i2)×· · ·×Id(id) formed by Cartesian products of intervals. Each cell C(i1, . . . , id)
contains a single v(i1, . . . , id). The support Cℓ of cluster ℓ is then defined as the union of cells C(i1, . . . , id)
such that the corresponding v(i1, . . . , id) ∈ Vℓ.
We now define a dither distribution by the probabilities
Pr
(
X˜ ∈ C(i1, . . . , id) | ℓ
)
=
nℓ(i1, . . . , id)
nℓ
. (10)
Conditioned on X˜ ∈ C(i1, . . . , id) (and independent of cluster ℓ), let X˜ be uniformly distributed over
C(i1, . . . , id).
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Figure 2: Partition of a two-dimensional (d = 2) quasi-identifier space into rectangular cells C(i1, i2), each
containing a single value v(i1, i2). Different shadings indicate the support sets of different clusters, which
may overlap. Cells C(1, 1) and C(2, 3) each contain n(1, 1) = n(2, 3) = 2 samples; all other cells with dots
contain n(i1, i2) = 1 sample. In (1, 1), both samples belong to cluster 1 (n1(1, 1) = 2), while in (2, 3), the
samples are split between clusters 2 and 3 (n2(2, 3) = n3(2, 3) = 1).
Theorem 2. For dither X˜ with piecewise-uniform conditional distribution defined by (10), the procedure
in Figure 1 is equivalent to resampling with replacement from the cluster values in Vℓ with probabilities
nℓ(i1, . . . , id)/nℓ.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
In the proof of Theorem 2, specifically in going from (19) to (20), the assumption of a piecewise-uniform
dither distribution is not strictly necessary. We have chosen to make this assumption because it simplifies
the proof and interpretation. Furthermore, in the one-dimensional case d = 1, the proof makes no reference
to uniformity or any property of the cell-conditional distributions other than continuity. In fact, the cell
probability requirements (10) can be further relaxed, specifically by merging contiguous cells that all belong
in full to the same cluster, i.e., cells such that n(i1) = nℓ(i1) for a single ℓ. We index these merged cells by
i′1 and denote by nℓ(i
′
1) the number of samples in cluster ℓ and cell i
′
1. Let the dither distribution satisfy
Pr
(
X˜ ∈ C(i′1) | ℓ
)
=
nℓ(i
′
1)
nℓ
∀ i′1. (11)
Corollary 3. In the one-dimensional case d = 1, Theorem 2 holds if the dither X˜ satisfies (11) for cells i′1
formed by first isolating unique observed values v1(i1) and then merging contiguous cells that belong in full
to the same cluster, as described above.
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 2, if x˜ belongs to a cell C(i′1), then u = FX˜(x˜) lies in an interval
that maps to the set of observed values v1(i1) contained in C(i′1), analogous to (18). Since Rosenblatt’s
transformation ensures that u is uniformly distributed, the individual values v1(i1) are then selected according
to their empirical frequency.
3.2.2 Gaussian dither
In this subsection, we assume that the centroid x¯ℓ is the mean of the samples in cluster ℓ, which results when
the weighted Euclidean distortion function (4) is chosen. For each cluster ℓ, we also compute the empirical
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covariance matrix Σℓ from the nℓ samples in the cluster. Conditioned on cluster ℓi, we then generate x˜i as an
i.i.d. sample from the Gaussian distribution N (x¯ℓi ,Σℓi + αI). The extra bit of covariance with parameter
α > 0 accounts for rank-deficient Σℓ, which occurs when the number of distinct values in the cluster (bounded
by nℓ ≥ k) is less than the dimension d.
The above specification implies that the dither X˜ is distributed as a Gaussian mixture with c mixture
components, after marginalizing over the clusters. Closed-form expressions can therefore be given for the
first half of Rosenblatt’s transformation (6). Denote by Φ(z;µ, σ2) the Gaussian CDF parameterized by
mean µ and variance σ2, and let Λℓ = Σℓ + αI. Then for j = 1 we have
FX˜1(x˜1) =
c∑
ℓ=1
pL(ℓ)FX˜1|L(x˜1 | ℓ) =
c∑
ℓ=1
nℓ
n
Φ
(
x˜1; x¯ℓ1,Λℓ,1,1
)
, (12)
where Λℓ,j,j is the (j, j) element of Λℓ. For j > 1,
FX˜j |X˜j−1
(
x˜j | x˜j−1
)
=
c∑
ℓ=1
pL|X˜j−1(ℓ | x˜j−1)FX˜j |X˜j−1,L
(
x˜j | x˜j−1, ℓ
)
. (13)
Since X˜ | L is multivariate Gaussian, X˜j | X˜j−1, L is also Gaussian with parameters given by
µℓj = x¯ℓj − Λℓ,j,1:j−1
(
Λℓ,1:j−1,1:j−1
)−1(
x˜j−1 − x¯j−1ℓ
)
σ2ℓj = Λℓ,j,j − Λℓ,j,1:j−1
(
Λℓ,1:j−1,1:j−1
)−1
Λℓ,1:j−1,j ,
where Λℓ,j,1:j−1 is a row vector consisting of the first j − 1 columns of the jth row of Λℓ (analogously for
Λℓ,1:j−1,j), and Λℓ,1:j−1,1:j−1 is the submatrix consisting of the first j − 1 rows and columns of Λℓ. Hence
FX˜j |X˜j−1,L
(
x˜j | x˜j−1, ℓ
)
= Φ
(
x˜j ;µℓj, σ
2
ℓj
)
. (14)
The conditional probabilities pL|X˜j−1(ℓ | x˜j−1) in (13) can be computed recursively over j = 1, . . . , d using
Bayes’ rule:
pL|X˜j(ℓ | x˜j) =
pL|X˜j−1(ℓ | x˜j−1)fX˜j |X˜j−1,L
(
x˜j | x˜j−1, ℓ
)
∑c
ℓ′=1 pL|X˜j−1(ℓ
′ | x˜j−1)fX˜j |X˜j−1,L
(
x˜j | x˜j−1, ℓ′
)
=
pL|X˜j−1(ℓ | x˜j−1)φ
(
x˜j ;µℓj, σ
2
ℓj
)
∑c
ℓ′=1 pL|X˜j−1(ℓ
′ | x˜j−1)φ(x˜j ;µℓ′j , σ2ℓ′j) ,
where the second equality follows from (14) and φ denotes a Gaussian PDF.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we discuss empirical results obtained using real-world data motivated by the problem of
health insurance market risk assessment. Section 4.1 further describes the application. Section 4.2 discusses
data sources and simulation of the different populations. Section 4.3 assesses the reidentification risks of the
proposed privacy preservation methods as applied to this data. Section 4.4 presents results on health care
expenditure prediction under three scenarios: with privacy constraints but without market shift, without
privacy constraints but with market shift, and with both privacy constraints and market shift.
4.1 Market Risk Assessment
As mentioned in the introduction, market risk assessment involves estimating the health care cost of individ-
uals in a new market who are likely to enroll in an insurer’s plan. These estimates can then be appropriately
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summarized into risk statistics for decision making. Cost information for a new market is typically not avail-
able for competitive and other reasons. Instead, insurers have access to cost data for their members in an
existing market, plus demographic data for the existing and new markets from public sources, including age,
gender, income, veteran status, smoking status, and place of residence. This situation suggests a covariate
shift approach as in Section 2 in which a predictive model relating demographic variables, X , to health care
cost, Y , is learned from the existing market population and is then applied to the new market’s demographic
data, taking into account the different demographic distributions in the existing and new markets, pX and
qX . Since the cost Y is regarded as being continuous, the learning problem (1) is one of regression. Any
regression technique can be used for this purpose, in particular those that account for the skewness and het-
eroscedasticity of health care costs, for example ordinary least-squares with log-transformed data, two-part
models, generalized linear models, and multiplicative regression [29, 30, 31]. These correspond to different
choices for the function class F and loss function L in (1).
However, market risk assessment differs from the standard covariate shift setting in Section 2 in having
a distinction between member populations and larger market populations, since only a subset of the latter
enroll in a given health insurance plan. To denote the different populations, we use the binary variables E
and M . The variable E indicates enrollment in an insurance company’s plan (E = 1 means enrolled), and
the variable M differentiates the existing market from the new market (M = 1 means new market). Since
training data with costs comes from the insurance company’s data on current plan members, the training
distribution, previously denoted as pX in Section 2, is now denoted as pX|E,M (x | e = 1,m = 0), referring to
enrollees in the current market. Likewise, the test distribution qX is pX|E,M (x | e = 1,m = 1) for enrollees
in the new market.
In some cases it may be possible to estimate pX|E,M(x | 1, 1) directly if enough is known about potential
enrollees in the new market. If this is true then the basic covariate shift framework in Section 2 applies. The
more general and usual case is that pX|E,M(x | 1, 1) cannot be estimated directly. In this scenario, besides
the current member distribution pX|E,M (x | 1, 0), we may still assume that demographic distributions for
the current and new markets are available, corresponding to pX|M (x | 0) and pX|M (x | 1) respectively. These
distributions are related by Bayes’ rule,
pX|E,M (x | 1,m) =
pE|X,M (1 | x,m)pX|M (x | m)
pE|M (1 | m) , m = 0, 1. (15)
Taking the ratio of m = 1 to m = 0 gives
pX|E,M (x | 1, 1)
pX|E,M (x | 1, 0) ∝
pE|X,M (1 | x, 1)
pE|X,M (1 | x, 0)
pX|M (x | 1)
pX|M (x | 0) (16)
as functions of x.
In this work, we make the assumption that pE|X,M (1 | x,m), the probability of enrollment conditioned
on the predictor variables and market, is actually independent of the market m once x is fixed. In other
words, E and M are conditionally independent given X and pE|X,M (1 | x,m) = pE|X(1 | x). This is a
reasonable starting assumption positing that enrollment depends on demographic variables such as age, sex,
etc., but does not depend on which market the individual belongs to once those demographic variables are
specified. This assumption may be later modified by an insurance market expert to account for additional
market factors such as the level of competition.
With the conditional independence assumption, (16) simplifies to
pX|E,M (x | 1, 1) ∝ pX|E,M (x | 1, 0)
pX|M(x | 1)
pX|M(x | 0) .
Since the training samples are distributed according to pX|E,M (x | 1, 0) while the test samples are distributed
according to pX|E,M (x | 1, 1), the importance weighting is therefore w(x) = pX|M (x | 1)/pX|M (x | 0), taking
the place of w(x) = qX(x)/pX(x) in Section 2. The importance weights may be estimated in the same
manner as before, for example non-parametrically using empirical distributions, or using logistic regression.
We evaluate both of these covariate shift methods in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3.
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A second notable feature of market risk assessment, and insurance applications in general, is the emphasis
on aggregate predictions of the average or total cost for groups of individuals rather than individual-level
predictions. For example, one may be interested in the average cost for a new enrollee population as a whole
or for segments of the population. Given a regression model constructed as described above, aggregate
predictions can be obtained simply by averaging the predictions for each individual in the group. In terms
of prediction error, this averaging has the effect of greatly attenuating the error variance: For a group of m
i.i.d. individuals, the error variance decreases by a factor of m. As a consequence, for large m the bias of the
predictor, b(Yˆ ) = E[Yˆ ] − E[Y ], becomes the dominant measure of error as compared to variance or R2, a
common representation of individual-level MSE. We refer the reader to [8] for a straightforward calculation
decomposing aggregate prediction error into bias and variance/R2 components. Thus in reporting prediction
results in Section 4.4, we focus more on bias performance rather than variance or R2.
4.2 Description of Data
We use publicly-available Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data, which shares many characteristics
with actual health cost data from insurance companies that we have worked with in the recent past but cannot
include in this paper due to its confidentiality. Based on large-scale surveys produced by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, MEPS contains
the annual health care cost and demographic information of people across the United States. However, since
it does not come from an insurance company, there is neither a concept of a market in the data nor of
enrollment in a company’s plan. Thus in order to perform market risk assessment, we define two market
populations and enrolled subsets of these populations as described below.
We consider a scenario in which an insurance company is currently active in many areas that collectively
are representative of the United States as a whole. The company is deciding whether to enter specific
rating areas in California, where a rating area consists of one or more counties. Therefore the demographic
distribution of the existing market, pX|M (x | 0), can be taken to be that of the United States, while the new
market distributions pX|M (x | 1) correspond to California rating areas. To simulate these two markets, the
MEPS data set is randomly and evenly split into training and test sets. All results reported in Sections 4.4.2–
4.4.3 are averaged over 200 such splits. The existing market distribution pX|M (x | 0) is estimated empirically
directly from the training set. The distribution pX|M (x | 1) is obtained by reweighing samples from the test
set according to the demographics of each rating area, relative to the national baseline represented by MEPS.
Rating area-specific demographics are obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS) [32].
Once the market distributions are created, the enrollment in the company’s plan must also be simulated.
We focus on the dependence of enrollment on age. To generate the existing plan distribution pX|E,M (x | 1, 0),
samples in the existing market data set are reweighed based on the age distribution in the initial enrollment
period of the Health Insurance Marketplaces created by the Affordable Care Act [33, 34], again relative to
the national baseline. The resulting distribution differs notably from that of the larger market, pX|M (x | 0),
in having few children (< 18) and seniors (> 65). The age-dependent enrollment probabilities pE|X(1 | x)
induced by this procedure are then applied to samples in the new market to simulate plan enrollment in the
new market, pX|E,M (x | 1, 1).
We also consider a second, simpler scenario where the demographic distribution of the existing and the
new markets, pX|M (x|0) and pX|M (x|1) are both taken to be that of the United States. The MEPS data
set is randomly and evenly split into training and test sets, but the test set is not reweighted in this case.
We present results for this scenario in Section 4.4.1 for 200 such splits. The plan distributions are simulated
using the same procedure described above and hence are also equal to each other.
The specific MEPS data set we consider is for the year 2005, containing just over 15000 weighted records,
and the demographic variables are gender, age (binned into 8 groups similar to those in [34]), education level
(0–5), and income level (categories 0–4 relative to the federal poverty level). The specific cost variable we
use is known in MEPS as “total expenditure” (TOTEXP) over the year.
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4.3 Reidentification Risk
In this section, we empirically evaluate the reidentification risks of the privacy preservation methods proposed
in Section 3. Here reidentification risk refers to the probability of correctly retrieving an individual’s record
from an anonymized data set using their true quasi-identifiers x. It is seen that for a given anonymity
parameter k, the distribution-recovering transformations discussed in Section 3.2 have reidentification risks
at least as good as or better than standard k-anonymization.
Enrollment data for the existing market (corresponding to pX|E,M(x | 1, 0)) is simulated from MEPS
as described in Section 4.2. Recall that this is the data set that requires privacy protection because it
contains health care expenditures. Each record in the data set is assigned a record number. The data set
then undergoes one of three procedures: 1) standard k-anonymization through clustering (Section 3.1), 2)
clustering plus distribution recovery via resampling with replacement (Section 3.2.1), and 3) clustering plus
distribution recovery via Gaussian dither (Section 3.2.2). The result is an anonymized data set with modified
quasi-identifiers xˆ. Before clustering, all variables x and y are standardized. The means and variances are
restored after the privacy transformations. We set w = 1 in the distortion function (4) for clustering and
add diagonal loading α = 1/3 to the Gaussian dither.
For reidentification, each record in the original data set is matched to the anonymized data set based
on quasi-identifiers, x and xˆ respectively. A minimum Euclidean distance criterion is used so that a match
is always returned, even if inexact (xˆ 6= x). In the frequent case of multiple matches (multiple xˆ at the
minimum distance), one of the anonymized records is selected uniformly at random. A reidentification is
declared if the record numbers of the original and matched records are the same.
We first discuss the reidentification performance to be expected under the above scheme. Successful
reidentification requires two events to occur: 1) the original quasi-identifiers x are mapped to a minimum-
distance point xˆ (often but not necessarily identical to x), and 2) the correct record is selected from multiple
matches. Conventional k-anonymization focuses on limiting the probability of the second event to no more
than 1/k by ensuring that every combination of quasi-identifier values (termed an equivalence class) in
the anonymized data set is shared by at least k records. The probability can be less than 1/k if some
equivalence classes have more than k records. In contrast, for the proposed distribution-preserving methods,
the distribution over equivalence classes follows that of the original data set and thus cannot be expected
to satisfy the k-record requirement. Instead it is the probability of the intersection of the two events that is
controlled at the same 1/k level. While an analysis of the general case is not straightforward, for the case
of resampling with replacement within a cluster of size k with no values in common with other clusters, it
can be verified that the probability of the intersection is exactly 1/k, as expected from symmetry. If there
are common values, then the probability is generally reduced because the second event of correct selection
becomes less likely if a common value is matched. In the case of Gaussian dither, the first event becomes
less likely because there is some probability of mapping x to a more distant point outside the cluster.
With this intuition in mind, we now discuss empirical results obtained by averaging multiple trials of the
above anonymization and reidentification procedure. The randomness in each trial is due to selection from
multiple matches in reidentification as well as dither in the distribution-preserving methods. Since the rei-
dentification algorithm depends on a record only through the equivalence class of x, we report reidentification
frequencies by equivalence class, of which there are 310 in the original data set.
Figure 3 shows histograms of reidentification frequencies over equivalence classes for the three privacy
protection methods, k = 5, and 1000 trials. For standard k-anonymization in Figure 3(a), the reidentification
frequency ranges from 0 to approximately 1/k = 1/5. As explained above, the distribution reflects the fact
that many equivalence classes in the original data set already exceed 5 members, in some cases by a large
factor. Similarly large equivalence classes are maintained after clustering. The few reidentification frequencies
greater than 1/5 can be attributed to sampling error. In the worst case, the reidentification frequency is
proportional to a binomial random variable with parameters 1000 and 1/5, and hence the observed frequency
may exceed 1/5.
For the distribution-preserving method using resampling, Figure 3(b) shows that the reidentification risk
is similar to that of k-anonymization. The histogram depends again on the range of equivalence class sizes
and also on the prevalence of common values between clusters, as mentioned earlier. On the other hand,
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Figure 3: Histograms of reidentification frequencies over 1000 trials for anonymity parameter k = 5. The
proposed distribution-preserving method using (b) resampling with replacement has similar reidentification
risk as (a) standard k-anonymization, while the distribution-preserving method using (c) Gaussian dither
has substantially lower risk. In (d), a histogram of differences in reidentification frequencies between the
resampling method and k-anonymization indicates that the former is better for a large majority of equivalence
classes.
the Gaussian dither method in Figure 3(c) has much lower reidentification risk. This can be attributed to
the choice of diagonal loading α = 1/3, which causes the Gaussian dither to frequently map original quasi-
identifiers x to points xˆ that are beyond minimum distance. Reducing α would increase the reidentification
risk. Figure 3(d) provides a more detailed comparison between the resampling method and k-anonymization
by plotting the histogram of differences in reidentification frequencies. For a large majority of equivalence
classes and k = 5, resampling offers slightly better privacy protection than k-anonymization. This is partly
offset by worse protection for a few equivalence classes. Figure 4 shows that all of the above patterns hold
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for k = 10 and 2000 trials.
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Figure 4: Histograms of reidentification frequencies over 2000 trials for anonymity parameter k = 10.
For larger k, the reidentification probabilities decrease accordingly, and direct empirical validation on
a per-equivalence-class basis would require increasing numbers of trials to combat the binomial sampling
error mentioned above. As an alternative, in Figure 5 we summarize performance by plotting the average
reidentification frequency over all records and 200 trials as a function of k. In all cases, these average
reidentification frequencies fall below the nominal value of 1/k due to the respective reasons given earlier in
this section. The margin is most substantial for k < 50 because of large equivalence classes. For smaller k,
the resampling method happens to yield slightly better privacy than k-anonymization while the Gaussian
dither method is much stronger, in agreement with Figs. 3 and 4. As k increases, k-anonymization and the
resampling method exchange places while the advantage of the Gaussian method diminishes.
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Figure 5: Reidentification frequency, averaged over all records and 200 trials, for different privacy protection
methods as a function of anonymity parameter k.
4.4 Privacy Preservation and Market Shift
We now discuss results in predicting health care expenditure as a function of the demographic variables
age, gender, education level, and income level, as detailed in Section 4.2. Age, education, and income level
are ordinal variables while gender is binary. The regression model used in all cases is a sum of univariate
functions of each demographic variable. We consider two cases as follows.
1. The univariate functions are not constrained to be linear and can vary arbitrarily with input value. We
refer to this case as “dummy-coded” since it can be achieved by dummy-coding the discrete variables,
i.e., introducing a binary variable for each level while leaving one level out to avoid linear dependence
on the intercept term.
2. The univariate functions are constrained to be linear in each variable. We refer to this second case as
“numeric” since it is achieved by interpreting the levels (e.g. 0–7 for age, 0–5 for education) as real
numeric values.
The regression model in the second case has many fewer degrees of freedom than the more flexible model
of the first case. For this specific MEPS data set, it can be observed that the first model does not offer
improvements in prediction accuracy compared to the simpler second model. We include results for the first
model to illustrate the behavior of a commonly used, more complicated model when subjected to privacy
preservation and covariate shift.
4.4.1 Prediction with Privacy Preservation
We first present results for the simpler scenario where there is no shift in the demographic distributions
between the existing and the new markets, as well as between the corresponding plan enrollment distributions.
The plan enrollment data from the existing market, i.e. the training data, is subjected to the same three
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Figure 6: (a) Prediction bias for dummy-coded variables, (b) R2 coefficient for dummy-coded variables, (c)
prediction bias for numeric variables, (d) R2 coefficient for numeric variables, and (e) histogram similar-
ity of distributions resulting from k-anonymization with and without the proposed distribution-preserving
procedures. For k-anonymity without distribution preservation, relative bias in (a), R2 in (b) and (d), and
distribution similarity in (e) all drop drastically with k and reach minimum values of −53.2, −1.193, −0.0139,
and 0.1709 respectively (not shown) for k = 1000. In (c), the lack of distribution preservation makes the
bias oscillate but it remains relatively small for all values of k. In contrast, both distribution-preserving
procedures result in almost constant bias and only small drops in R2 and distribution similarity.
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types of privacy-preserving transformations as in Section 4.3. Figure 6 shows the relative bias and coefficient
of determination R2 in predicting health care cost in the new market as the anonymity parameter k increases.
For the nonlinear dummy-coded model in Figure 6(a) and Figure 6(b), it is clear that performance drops
dramatically when distribution-preserving approaches are not used. Conversely, performance remains either
constant or only drops slightly using the proposed distribution-preserving approaches. For the linear numeric
model in Figure 6(c) and Figure 6(d), the difference is less stark: Without distribution preservation, relative
bias oscillates at a relatively low level while R2 decreases to a negative but less extreme value. These
results suggest that the simpler linear model is inherently more robust to privacy transformations but can
nevertheless be improved by the proposed distribution-preservation methods.
The poor performance of k-anonymization without distribution preservation can be understood from two
perspectives. First, since in conventional k-anonymization, samples of X are replaced with the corresponding
cluster centers x¯ℓ, the number of unique samples for training the regression model decreases to
⌊
n
k
⌋
, a
substantial reduction when k is large. It is well-known that the prediction error of a linear regression model
tends to decrease at a O(1/
√
n) rate, where n is the training sample size [35]. Second, in Figure 6(e) we
plot the similarity between the training data distribution after privacy transformation and the test data
distribution. We use the histogram intersection similarity [36] for concreteness, for which a value close to 1
implies that the predictor is trained on a distribution much like the one encountered in testing. Figure 6(e)
indicates that this similarity falls dramatically with k under conventional k-anonymization. Overall, it is
clear that distribution preservation is beneficial to achieving useful k-anonymity even when simple workloads
such as linear regression are involved.
Table 1: Dummy-coded variable performance results for rating areas of California as new markets for no
shift, logistic shift, and non-parametric shift.
New Market R2 value Relative Bias (%)
No Shift Logistic Non-param. No Shift Logistic Non-param.
RA 1 0.0300 0.0271 0.0280 4.38 4.64 1.86
RA 2 0.0243 0.0228 0.0220 3.75 2.14 -0.49
RA 3 0.0289 0.0272 0.0270 2.34 1.87 -0.24
RA 4 0.0291 0.0278 0.0264 -2.54 -2.39 1.40
RA 5 0.0221 0.0212 0.0214 3.63 1.76 0.53
RA 6 0.0235 0.0232 0.0227 2.17 1.42 0.69
RA 7 0.0233 0.0227 0.0219 2.31 1.40 -0.39
RA 8 0.0213 0.0213 0.0196 1.12 -0.69 -1.29
RA 9 0.0233 0.0219 0.0230 5.99 5.67 0.32
RA 10 0.0330 0.0316 0.0323 3.48 2.87 0.57
RA 11 0.0314 0.0290 0.0306 4.90 4.87 2.17
RA 12 0.0246 0.0233 0.0243 4.29 3.49 0.18
RA 13 0.0328 0.0294 0.0253 -1.03 -0.53 0.10
RA 14 0.0345 0.0331 0.0330 2.47 1.79 0.36
RA 15-16 0.0295 0.0281 0.0286 2.83 2.62 0.81
RA 17 0.0318 0.0300 0.0302 0.72 0.24 -0.77
RA 18 0.0250 0.0246 0.0252 3.75 2.85 0.84
RA 19 0.0268 0.0258 0.0268 3.36 3.07 1.23
4.4.2 Prediction with Market Shift
Next we discuss cost prediction in the absence of privacy-preserving data transformations but with a shift
in demographic distribution between the existing and the new markets. Two covariate shift methods are
compared, corresponding respectively to non-parametric and logistic regression methods of estimating the
importance weights w(x). A baseline method that does not account for covariate shift is also compared.
Table 1 and Table 2 summarize performance in predicting the cost in rating areas of California as new
markets using nonlinear dummy-coded and linear numeric models respectively. As discussed in Section 4.1,
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for aggregate prediction the bias is often the more important performance metric. Table 1 shows that the
baseline approach using the dummy-coded model has a noticeable bias, and the covariate shift approaches
reduce the bias for most new markets by shifting the distribution of existing plan members to look more like
prospective enrollees in the new market. This reduction is particularly significant with the non-parametric
shift method. With the linear numeric model in Table 2, the relative bias is lower for the baseline, but still,
the non-parametric shift method tends to offer a reduction over the baseline approach in most rating areas.
In fact, the biases of the covariate shift methods under the dummy-coded model and the numeric model are
similar in most markets. Performing covariate shift is more useful with the nonlinear dummy-coded model,
which is very common in several applications, but also provides some advantage for the numeric model.
Table 2: Numeric variable performance results for rating areas of California as new markets for no shift,
logistic shift, and non-parametric shift.
New Market R2 value Relative Bias (%)
No Shift Logistic Non-param. No Shift Logistic Non-param.
RA 1 0.0312 0.0286 0.0291 0.47 4.49 1.81
RA 2 0.0260 0.0247 0.0242 1.15 1.76 -0.48
RA 3 0.0288 0.0275 0.0273 0.06 1.56 -0.30
RA 4 0.0296 0.0289 0.0279 -2.39 -1.94 1.27
RA 5 0.0247 0.0238 0.0238 0.97 1.47 0.48
RA 6 0.0252 0.0249 0.0248 0.22 1.43 0.63
RA 7 0.0260 0.0257 0.0256 0.90 1.65 -0.45
RA 8 0.0245 0.0239 0.0232 -1.20 -0.83 -1.34
RA 9 0.0236 0.0225 0.0235 4.41 5.94 0.30
RA 10 0.0316 0.0304 0.0311 3.01 3.57 0.50
RA 11 0.0308 0.0290 0.0305 3.16 5.67 2.04
RA 12 0.0265 0.0253 0.0259 1.15 3.41 0.13
RA 13 0.0326 0.0307 0.0291 -0.85 0.13 -0.09
RA 14 0.0337 0.0328 0.0328 1.87 2.52 0.20
RA 15-16 0.0292 0.0287 0.0290 2.96 3.05 0.73
RA 17 0.0312 0.0301 0.0300 0.86 0.86 -0.85
RA 18 0.0258 0.0252 0.0258 2.63 3.00 0.79
RA 19 0.0283 0.0272 0.0279 1.45 3.18 1.17
4.4.3 Prediction with Privacy Preservation and Market Shift
Lastly we present results for the scenario in which both the insurer’s existing plan data is subjected to the
three privacy transformations used in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.1, and there is a demographic shift between the
existing and new markets. We focus in this subsection on California rating area 18 as the new market.
Figure 7 shows results for k-anonymization without distribution preservation. As k increases, the orig-
inal samples from the plan data are represented more and more coarsely by their cluster centers. As a
consequence, covariate shift methods fail and prediction accuracy suffers markedly. In fact, both bias and
R2 are unacceptably bad for the dummy-coded data model. For the numeric data model, the bias does
not actually deteriorate by much under the baseline approach, again pointing toward the robustness of the
simple linear model. However, R2 still decreases to negative values. The covariate shift methods continue to
yield unacceptable bias but manage to keep R2 positive.
Figure 8 shows the prediction performance of the proposed privacy-preserving procedure using resampling
with replacement combined with different covariate shift methods. In great contrast to Figure 7, the relative
bias stays low for all values of k while R2 decreases only slightly with increasing k. The main difference
between the dummy-coded and numeric models is that the bias remains almost constant in the latter case
when the baseline method is used.
Figure 9 depicts performance under privacy preservation with Gaussian dither. In this case, the bias
remains controlled but increases with k to a level higher than for the resampling method in Figure 8.
18
A possible explanation for the difference between the two distribution-preserving methods can be found in
Figures 3–5 and Section 4.3. There it is seen that the Gaussian dither method has much lower reidentification
risk, likely as a result of mapping original quasi-identifiers x to distant points xˆ. This mapping however may
further distort the relationship between X and Y relative to the original, causing the prediction bias to
increase. In the dummy-coded case, the non-parametric covariate shift method succeeds at reducing bias for
all k. In the numeric case, covariate shift methods reduce bias only for k < 50. On the other hand, R2 is
slightly lower for the covariate shift methods because the reweighting of training samples to reduce bias also
introduces some additional variability.
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Figure 7: Performance results with no distribution preservation: (a) dummy-coded prediction bias, (b)
dummy-coded R2 coefficient, (c) numeric prediction bias, and (d) numeric R2 coefficient. For dummy-coded
data, the prediction error increases unacceptably as k increases. For numeric data, the bias drops only
moderately for the baseline case whereas the R2 coefficient becomes unacceptable for large values of k. With
the covariate shift methods, the bias drops rapidly, whereas the R2 coefficient decreases slowly, as k increases.
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Figure 8: Performance results for intra-cluster dither: (a) dummy-coded prediction bias, (b) dummy-coded
R2 coefficient, (c) numeric prediction bias, and (d) numeric R2 coefficient. For dummy-coded data, as k
increases, relative bias stays low whereas the R2 coefficient has a generally decreasing trend. For numeric
data, as k increases, the baseline results in an almost-constant bias and a steady decrease in the R2 coefficient.
For the two shift methods, the relative bias with numeric data is similar to the case with dummy-coded data.
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Figure 9: Performance results for Gaussian dither: (a) dummy-coded prediction bias, (b) dummy-coded
R2 coefficient, (c) numeric prediction bias, and (d) numeric R2 coefficient. For dummy-coded data, as k
increases, distribution preservation moderates the increase in bias, while the covariate shift methods reduce
bias. For numeric data, as k increases, the baseline results in an almost-constant bias and a steady decrease
in the R2 coefficient. For the two shift methods, the relative bias with numeric data is similar to the case
with dummy-coded data.
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Figure 10: Area under histogram intersection between the estimated and actual new enrollment distributions
for different covariate shift methods and (a) no distribution preservation, (b) intra-cluster dither, or (c) Gaus-
sian dither. Both proposed distribution-preserving transformations maintain a mostly constant similarity as
the anonymity k increases, whereas the similarity deteriorates rapidly without distribution preservation.
Overall, Figures 7–9 demonstrate the advantage of preserving quasi-identifier distributions when k-
anonymization is required in a covariate shift setting. Some insight into the above results can be seen
in Figure 10, which depicts the same histogram intersection similarity used in Figure 6(e), this time between
the new enrollment distribution estimated from privacy-transformed training data using the covariate shift
methods, and the actual new enrollment. Under conventional k-anonymization in Figure 10(a), the similar-
ity decreases rapidly with k, but using distribution-preserving privacy transformations in Figure 10(b) and
Figure 10(c), the similarity can be kept mostly constant as the anonymity k increases and can be further
enhanced by the covariate shift methods.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, our main contribution has been to develop a new privacy preservation operation that has the
key property of preserving the data distribution of the quasi-identifiers. The specific privacy criterion we
address is k-anonymity, which is a common mathematical interpretation of legal privacy standards. We have
shown how such distribution preservation is a clear need in supervised machine learning settings such as
covariate shift and transfer learning that also require anonymized microdata. Other data analysis workloads
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that require both anonymization and lack of distortion in the data distribution will also benefit from the
proposed methodology. Workloads requiring distribution preservation have not yet been addressed in the
data privacy literature.
Our proposed technique combines k-member clustering with components from distribution-preserving
quantization, namely dithering and Rosenblatt’s transformation. Distribution-preserving quantization was
originally developed in the audio signal processing literature and has never been applied to privacy appli-
cations before. We have analyzed two approaches for dithering, intra-cluster and Gaussian, and shown how
both achieve distribution preservation when followed by Rosenblatt’s transformation. Existing distribution-
preserving quantization takes the number of clusters as input rather than constraining the cluster size; thus,
another contribution of our work is the extension of distribution-preserving quantization to a constrained
setting.
Moreover, we have contributed to a solution to the real-world health care market risk assessment problem,
a common problem encountered by health insurance companies that was especially pertinent after passage
of the Affordable Care Act. Insurance companies had not developed machine learning approaches for this
problem, only relying on crude estimates mainly driven by intuition and coarse aggregate-level data. We
show successful empirical results on MEPS data with realistic simulations for new markets and enrollment
probabilities. (Actual health cost data from insurance companies that we have worked with in the recent
past is confidential.)
In particular, we see that the overall method with intra-cluster dithering keeps the reidentification risk
approximately the same as k-member clustering, which is sufficient for the requirement of k-anonymity.
The Gaussian dither has even lower reidentification risk. Additionally, the non-parametric version of the
covariate shift is successful in significantly reducing the relative bias of the regression that would occur if the
covariate shift were not done. Examining the results of the full solution, we see that without our new privacy
preservation methods, cost prediction can fail for k-anonymity greater than ten or twenty, but prediction
results remain satisfactory when using our proposed approach.
One health care application-specific direction for future work addresses the following issue. In the market
risk assessment problem, it is possible that the conditional distribution pY |X is not the same in the training
and test populations, i.e., current and new markets, unlike in the standard covariate shift problem. For
example, the overall cost of living in the new market may differ from that in the existing market and
this may affect health care costs as well. However, it is unlikely for there to be sufficient data to learn
the full conditional distribution pY |X,M (otherwise market shift would not be much of a problem). One
approximation is to assume a simple scaling where an underlying conditional distribution pY |X is scaled
by a cost-of-living factor a(M) depending on M (implying that the conditional mean for example is E[Y |
X,M ] = a(M)E[Y | X ]).
A general direction for future work is theoretical analysis of the proposed privacy-preservation method.
Dithered quantization has much supporting theory that we would like to further explore in the context of
privacy, where it has never been applied before. We would also like to explore stronger notions of privacy
such as l-diversity [37] and t-closeness [38] as well as non-discrimination and equitability (an issue that is
mathematically similar to privacy [39]), all of which have not been examined for distribution-preserving
workloads. Exploration of different solution methods for the k-member clustering optimization problem is
of interest as well.
A Proof of Theorem 2
It suffices to prove that if x˜ ∈ C(i∗1, . . . , i∗d), then Rosenblatt’s transformation yields xˆ = v(i∗1, . . . , i∗d) with
probability 1 for any (i∗1, . . . , i
∗
d) so that the cell probabilities in (10) translate directly into the desired
resampling probabilities. This can be done by induction over the dimensions j = 1, . . . , d.
For j = 1, we consider the CDF FX˜1(x˜1) used in the first step of transformation (6). For any i
∗
1 =
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1, . . . , n1, the law of total probability gives
Pr
(
X˜1 ∈ I1(i∗1)
)
=
c∑
ℓ=1
pL(ℓ)
∑
i1,...,id
Pr
(
X˜ ∈ C(i1, . . . , id) | ℓ
)
Pr
(
X˜1 ∈ I1(i∗1) | X˜ ∈ C(i1, . . . , id)
)
.
Substituting (10) and using the fact that
Pr
(
X˜1 ∈ I1(i∗1) | X˜ ∈ C(i1, . . . , id)
)
=
{
1, i1 = i
∗
1,
0, i1 6= i∗1,
we obtain
Pr
(
X˜1 ∈ I1(i∗1)
)
=
c∑
ℓ=1
nℓ
n
∑
i2,...,id
nℓ(i
∗
1, i2, . . . , id)
nℓ
=
∑
i2,...,id
n(i∗1, i2, . . . , id)
n
= pX1
(
v1(i
∗
1)
)
(17)
by the definition of empirical distribution. It follows that for x˜1 ∈ I1(i∗1),
i∗1−1∑
i1=1
pX1
(
v1(i1)
) ≤FX˜1(x˜1) ≤
i∗1∑
i1=1
pX1
(
v1(i1)
)
,
FX1
(
v1(i
∗
1 − 1)
) ≤FX˜1(x˜1) ≤ FX1(v1(i∗1)). (18)
Combining (18) with (6) and (9) for j = 1, we conclude that xˆ1 = v1(i
∗
1) with probability 1.
For j > 1, we consider the conditional distribution of X˜j given X˜
j−1 = x˜j−1. Let f denote a generic
probability density function (PDF). Starting from
Pr
(
X˜j ∈ Ij(i∗j ) | X˜j−1 = x˜j−1
)
=
∫
Ij(i∗j )
fX˜j(x˜
j)dx˜j
fX˜j−1(x˜
j−1)
,
we apply a similar total probability decomposition as above to both numerator and denominator to obtain
Pr
(
X˜j ∈ Ij(i∗j ) | X˜j−1 = x˜j−1
)
=
∑
i1,...,id
n(i1, . . . , id)
n
∫
Ij(i∗j )
fX˜j |C
(
x˜j | C(i1, . . . , id)
)
dx˜j
∑
i1,...,id
n(i1, . . . , id)
n
fX˜j−1|C
(
x˜j−1 | C(i1, . . . , id)
) . (19)
Since x˜j′ ∈ Ij′ (i∗j′) for j′ < j, the PDFs in the numerator and denominator of (19) are zero unless ij′ = i∗j′ ,
j′ < j, while in the numerator, the integral is also zero unless ij = i
∗
j , in which case x˜j is marginalized out.
Hence the numerator becomes∑
ij+1,...,id
n(i∗1, . . . , i
∗
j , ij+1, . . . , id)
n
fX˜j−1|C
(
x˜j−1 | C(i∗1, . . . , i∗j , ij+1, . . . , id)
)
,
while the denominator is similar except for an additional sum over ij . We now exploit the fact that X˜
j−1 is
uniformly distributed conditioned on a cell, i.e. with |I| denoting the width of interval I,
fX˜j−1|C
(
x˜j−1 | C(i∗1, . . . , i∗j−1, ij, . . . , id)
)
=

 j−1∏
j′=1
|Ij′ (i∗j′)|


−1
, ∀ ij , . . . , id.
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This implies that all remaining PDFs in the numerator and denominator have the same value, reducing (19)
to
Pr
(
X˜j ∈ Ij(i∗j ) | X˜j−1 = x˜j−1
)
=
∑
ij+1,...,id
n(i∗1, . . . , i
∗
j , ij+1, . . . , id)
n
∑
ij ,...,id
n(i∗1, . . . , i
∗
j−1, ij , . . . , id)
n
=
pXj
(
vj(i∗1, . . . , i
∗
j )
)
pXj−1
(
vj−1(i∗1, . . . , i
∗
j−1)
)
= pXj |Xj−1
(
vj(i
∗
j ) | vj−1(i∗1, . . . , i∗j−1)
)
. (20)
Similar to (17) and (18), (20) implies that for x˜j′ ∈ Ij′ (i∗j′), j′ = 1, . . . , j,
FXj |Xj−1
(
vj(i
∗
j − 1) | vj−1(i∗1, . . . , i∗j−1)
)
≤ FX˜j |X˜j−1
(
x˜j | x˜j−1
)
≤ FXj |Xj−1
(
vj(i
∗
j ) | vj−1(i∗1, . . . , i∗j−1)
)
.
We combine these last inequalities with (6) and (9), where xˆj−1 = vj−1(i∗1, . . . , i
∗
j−1) by the inductive
assumption. This establishes that xˆj = vj(i
∗
j ) with probability 1.
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